INTRODUCTION Despite limited interests in Islam and the dynamics of Muslim societies among
American sociologists, the theoretical and historical debates in Islamic studies have revolved, on a higher level of abstraction, around some of the same fundamental issues that concern sociologists: the status of rational analysis in Quranic exegesis, the Islamic conception of sovereignty and the nature of the state in Islamic countries, law and order, crime and punishment, the status of women, and war and peace. In the same manner that sociologists are interested in advancing scientific knowledge of the relationship between religion and society in general, civilization provided by the status of women. "The condition of the women," said Mill (1848, p. 309), "is one of the most remarkable circumstances in the manners of nations. Among the rude people, the women are generally degraded; among civilized people they are exalted." The utilitarian principles of exactness and completeness, laissez-faire economics, the Newtonian conception of natural law, deistic religion, the idea of progress as the organizing principle of a universal history-all were used to judge Indian society. For Mill, the organizing principle of history was the scale of nations. Conjecturing the place of Indians on the scale being low, he condemned "every single aspect of their way of life as barbarous, not only their science, but their philosophy, their art and their manners" (Forbes 1951, p. 29) .
This perspective provided the intellectual justification for the Westernizing policies of colonial administrators,l and impacted the development of modem ideologies in the Islamic world (Hourani 1983 , Moaddel 2001a . In the twentieth century, its secularist premise had the greatest impact on historical thinking about Islam and modem politics. For example, in his analysis of cultural change in Egypt in the second quarter of the twentieth century, Safran (1961) presumed Islam's incompatibility with liberal politics. For him, the commitment of Egyptian cultural elite to rationalism was necessary for the success of the country's liberal experiment . When these intellectuals abandoned this principle in favor of the Islamic subject, a crisis of orientation ensued. While Safran generated interesting debates on the causes of Egypt's cultural turn in the late 1930s (Smith 1973 , Gershoni & Jankowski 1995 , Gershoni 1999 , none of the commentators questioned the central assumption regarding the incongruity of Islam and rationalism or entertained the idea that the rise of radical Islamism in this period, far from being a reflection of Egyptians' Islamic identity, was produced in reaction to the overly secularist outlook of the country's intellectual leaders (Moaddel 2002 ).
The Islamicists' Perspective
There is an affinity between the proponents of the rationalist-Westernizing model of political modernity and the Islamicists. If the former used the European experience as the scale of a universal history to judge the political experience of historical ' Convinced of the incompatibility of Islam and modem life, Hunter (1871, p. 136) claimed that "no young man, whether Hindu or Muhammadan, passes through our Anglo-Indian schools without learning to disbelieve the faith of his fathers. The luxuriant religions of Asia shriveled into dry sticks when brought into contact with the icy realities of Western Science." Likewise, Cromer was convinced that the educated Egyptians remained Muslims no more; they were "demoslemised Moslems and invertebrate Europeans" (Cromer 1908, p. 228). And "in passing through the European educational mill, the young Egyptian Moslem loses his Islamism, or, at all events, he loses the best part of it" (p. 230, see also Milner 1892, p. 5). A similar point of view underpinned the French assimilationist policies in Algeria (see Ruedy 1992).
Islam, the Islamicists attempted to uncover certain features in Islamic tradition that in their view hindered the development of a modem political order. Nevertheless, despite the secularist bias they share with the rationalist-Westernizers, the Islamicists' have made important contributions by offering explicit propositions regarding the Islamic origins of the political institutions, authoritarianism, the failure of democratic polity, public political orientations, and political extremism in Islamic countries.2
ISLAM AND POLITICS: CONSERVATISM VERSUS REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVISM The
Islamicists widely argued that the Islamic theories of government strongly tilted toward conservatism and abstention from revolutionary action. This is so because the political language of Islam contains no precept to rebel against a bad government. Instead classical Islam teaches the duty to resist an impious ruler. This doctrine, however, is inadequate because, in the first place, it is unclear "how the lawfulness or sinfulness of a command was to be tested; in the second place no legal procedure or apparatus was ever devised or set up for enforcing the law against the ruler" (Lewis 1972, p. 33). Further, the circumstances prevailing in Islamic countries-such as the threat of tribal conflicts and chaos-prompted the theorists to stress the need for the ruler's effective power to maintain order and to justify obedience to him. This appreciation of order in turn helped to strengthen traditionalism in all aspects of life-religion, politics, literature, and thought. in Arabic refers to the charismatic political leader, the earliest use of the term indicated that it was not a compliment (Lewis 1988, pp. 59-60) . When a certain Imam of the Yemen called himself "commander of the faithful," he was addressed in the protocol of the Mamluk chancery of Egypt as the "za'im of the faithful." In other words, "he thinks he is, but we know better." But in the modem period, the term was used in a positive sense as Egyptian Nationalist leader Mustafa Kamil was called al-za'im al-amin, "the faithful leader," and President Qasim of Iraq, called himself al-za'im al-awhad, "the unique leader" (Lewis 1988, p. 60). For Sharabi (1963, p. 590) also, za' im is a type of leadership claimed by Arab leaders to legitimize the power they had seized through a military coup, when "the unknown successful leader of a coup d'etat emerges at first as a genuine za' im, that is, as a savior, a hero, a symbol of national honor and freedom, and in possession of all power in the state." Likewise, Vatikiotis (1973, p. 310) considered za'im and za'ama as part of a preexisting Islamic cultural tradition, giving credence to authoritarian leaderships in post-coup Egypt and post-revolutionary Algeria.
For Lapidus (1992) , on the other hand, modem authoritarianism is rooted in the second golden age of historical Islam highlighted by the rise of Islamic empires. Under these empires, classical Islamic theory of sovereignty retreated to provide a space for a secular theory of patrimonialism, where "power is not an expression of the total society but the prerogative of certain individuals or groups," and where "the exercise of political power was organized through networks of clients and retainers" (p. 17). This historical legacy of authoritarianism and clientalist patrimonialism has continued into the modem period as, for example, "many features of Turkish republic and the Ataturk program may be derived from the patrimonial premises of the Ottoman empire" (p. 23).
ISLAM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY While various features of Islamic tradition are employed to explain the rise of authoritarian regimes, the failure of democracy in the Muslim world is attributed to Islam's conceptual inadequacy in the area of individual rights. Lewis (1993b) argued that Western democracy is rooted in Roman law of the legal person-a corporate entity with certain rights and obligations. While Christianity "was forced to recognize the authority of Roman law" (Gibb 1947 , p. 85), in Islam, in contrast, there is no such recognition, hence, no legislative function. And without legislative function, there is no need for legislative institutions nor for any principle of representation (Lewis 1993b ).
There is still another way that Islamic cultural tradition constrained the development of democratic polity. It may be argued that the varying conceptions of humans upheld in Christianity and Islam could have been a factor that contributed to the rise of democracy in the West and the persistence of authoritarianism in the Islamic world. "Christian political thinkers began from the premises that man was a disobedient sinner and that the Almighty detested the stench of anarchy" (Perry 1989 , p. 8). Given man's essentially evil character, these thinkers devised a formula to tame a political ruler. As Madison & Hamilton (1911, p. 264) stated, "if men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary." This pessimistic view of human nature in fact may have led to the development of democratic political institutions as thinkers like Madison devised the system of checks and balances to keep the rulers from misrule. In the Islamic tradition, on the other hand, there is an optimistic view of humans, which, it may be postulated, ensured the extension of the system of patriarchy in the Islamic world into the modern era. For there was no need to question the power of the patriarch, who is in essence a dogooder. In classical Islamic political theory, the emphasis is to find and install the rightful caliph. After he is installed, following his order is binding to all Muslims.
One may question this interpretation, for Islam not only recommended rebelling against an impious leader, but also provided a conceptual foundation for the development of democracy. Such concepts as shura (consultative body), ijma (consensus), and masliha (utility) pointed to an affinity between Islam and democracy. The problem in Islamic sociopolitical theory is then the absence of an adequate test of "Islamicity" (Gragg 1957 When thinkers as diverse as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Khaldun declared that the caliphate after the death of the fourth caliph had ceased to exist and the sovereignty exercised by the Umayyads (661-750) and the Abbasids (750-1258) had never been more than a "royalty" (Encyclopedia ofIslam 1960, p. 945), they admitted the existence of a political reality in the Islamic land whose governing principles were something other than the shari'a. These thinkers, however, did not recommend rebelling against the ruler. Instead, they attempted to uncover the sociological principles governing his actions in order to reconcile religion and the secular law of politics. It is thus from appreciating the dynamic of Islamic culture giving rise to a secular analysis that it may be possible to detect the orientalizing nature of the Islamicists' account of the Muslim theologians' attitude toward the existing polity. Contrary to the Islamicists' claims, it is not that these theologians were attempting to make concession to political expediency and thus became appreciative of the status quo. It is rather because they were facing different kinds of intellectual as well as practical problems-striving to find a formula to overcome the destructive power of tribal warlords and the vanities of paganism. On the reality of Oriental despotism, Ibn Khaldun was certainly in agreement with the Islamicists as is evident from his disapproval of royal authority as a form of social organization that "requires superiority and force, which expresses the wrathfulness and animality (of human nature)" (Ibn Khaldun 1967, p. 385).
Ibn Khaldun's political sociology addressed the problem of political order. He was aware of the destructiveness of the bedouin tribes and the contradiction between their natural disposition and urban civilization. He was also cognizant of the bedouins' ability to found states. He formulated a cyclical theory of dynastic change to explain the process of the rise, consolidation, expansion, and eventual demise of royal authority. He coined the concept asabiyya as a type of group solidarity based on blood or strong bond of mutual affections among the members of the group, which make them willing to fight and die for one another. This solidarity is the key element in the bedouins' military prowess and driving force that enabled them to overcome city-dwellers and establish royal authority. Once the state is set up, the ruler creates a new system of power relations and governmental structures, which creates a period of political stability, a necessary condition for the expansion of division of labor and the flourishing of civilization. With contentment and luxury, however, a period of decline begins, the asabiyya of soldiers weakens, the ruler's extravagances lead to heavier taxes, divisions within the dynasty occur, and urban civilization eventually vanishes. In the end, the old dynasty is replaced by a new one, which draws power from a new group. Such is the natural life span of dynasties. For Ibn Khaldun, however, an enduring state was possible only through the introduction of religion to create a new bond of unity to fill the void created by the decline of the asabiyya and weakening of the link between the ruler and ruled at the later stage of the natural life span (Hourani 1983, pp. 22-24) .
In this manner, the shari'a once more would become the organizing principles of society. Ibn Khaldun's path-breaking Muqaddima (An Introduction to History) in three impressive volumes was thus an intellectual exercise to resolve the practical and theological problems facing his faith. His historical project, however, went beyond religious reasoning and produced a secular scientific approach to the study of social life. This work furnished a conceptual framework and a set of ideas and propositions about the geographic and climatic conditions of human civilization, bedouins' social characteristics, the succession of and the differences in group solidarity between the bedouins and sedentary people, the principles of economic growth and transformation, royal authorities, the caliphate, and jurisprudence (Ibn Khaldun 1967).
The rediscovery of Ibn Khaldun in the nineteenth century generated considerable interest among historians and social scientists. Among recent works that addressed various aspects of Ibn Khaldun's perspective, one may cite an assessment of its contribution to historiography (Lacoste 1984) and to economic thought (Soofi 1995 
The Anthropology of Political Islam
The broader social context operationalized in terms of such variables as changes in class relations, class politics, the rise of the new middle class professionals, the emergence of a cultural duality, and most significantly the structure and policies of the state may account for cross-national variations and similarities in the Islamic movements. Nevertheless, these variables, by themselves, do not account for the specificity of the Islamic movement within its sociohistorical setting, and they tend to overlook the microprocesses at work in the generation of Muslim politics. Anthropologists have attempted to fill this void by noting the vast regional and temporal variations in Islamic rituals and symbols, each case constituting an "ordered universe" whose order is revealed by comparing (Geertz 1968, pp. 54 ). For them, these space-and time-bound microprocesses may be discovered by focusing on the structure of the religious system within the network of myth, ritual, and magic (Zein 1974, pp. xix, xxi). Contrary to the Islamicists who fixed their gaze on abstract religious ideas and the proponents of the social processes models who stressed macro-variables, the proponents of these approaches attempted to demonstrate how religious rituals in their specific context, for example, legitimize the pattern of social exchange and political structure of patron-client relationship When combined with a macro-social processes model, the objectification and fragmentation provides a more complete explanation of Muslim politics. On a general level, objectification simply implies a process whereby people become conscious of their own culture, including religion, and fragmentation points to the emergence of competing claims over cultural authority. Thus these two processes, by themselves, do not explain the politicization of religion. If under certain circumstances objectification and fragmentation would give rise to Islamic activism, it is because the monolithic cultural order, imposed from above by the secular ideological and intrusive state, politicized religion and provided a favorable context for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. This interpretation is reinforced by considering the process of cultural change in post-revolutionary Iran, where a monolithic religious discourse is imposed from above, and where the process of objectification and fragmentation, far from politicizing religion, has given rise to some sort of civic Islamic movement and secularization of religion (Moaddel 2001 ).
RENTIERISM VERSUS ISLAM: POLITICS UNDER THE RENTIER STATE
Any sociological study of the relationship between Islamic culture and politics would be inadequate without considering other sociohistorical variables that may account for the specificity of politics in Islamic countries. This is true given that a significant trend in recent historiography of Islamic countries has concluded that "in most Muslim-ruled politics throughout most of history, the nature of ritual practice, codes of law, spiritual orientation, or whatever has been irrelevant to the state" (Metcalf 1995 The second level requires a systematic comparative analysis of the Islamic texts with those of Western or other cultural traditions. This exercise may be useful in assessing the status of, for example, the economic category in the Islamic thought in light of the centrality of this category in Western tradition (Dumont 1977 ). Or one may be able to determine the degree to which the rationalization of economic thought and activity in Islam, or lack thereof, affected the relative significance of the economic vis-a-vis the ideological. It may be possible to asses the degree to which Islamic culture departed or conformed to what may be considered the triumph of the economic over the ideological in Western context, which is believed to have signified "a calming of the ideological impulse, allowing its creative expression but swiftly clipping its excesses, which in turn aided the foundation of a civil society" (Seneviratne 1999 , p. 15) .
The third level entails a comparative analysis of the Islamic texts with nonIslamic narrative and legendary material in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and other indigenous languages. Narrative texts contained useful data for sociological analysis (Franzosi 1998) , and the cultural traditions of Islamic countries are replete with vast resources of poetry, parables, stories, and religious/nonreligious mythologies. These resources convey invaluable information on how meanings are constructed, people's subjectivity is formed, the conceptions of "us versus others" take shape, and the nationalist, ethnic, or religious identity is constituted. Are there differences between the religious narrative and nonreligious narratives in terms of the structure of meaning they carry?
In sum, several analytical levels are involved in the study of Islamic culturediversity in Muslim histories versus the formality of the Islamic text, Islam as a beliefs system versus Islam as a discourse, the political behavior and the views of Muslim political leaders versus cross-national variation in the world views of the Islamic publics. Recognizing that each level often explains only a particular aspect of Muslim politics would certainly prevent the occurrence of what might be termed an ecological fallacy (e.g., using text-based knowledge to explain Muslim political behavior) and so enrich the discipline of Islamic studies.
